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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between the sources of funding for research activities and 
the engagement of scientists in one specific type of knowledge transfer: academic consulting. By 
relying on a sample of 2603 individual faculty, from five Spanish universities, who have been 
recipients of publicly funded grants or have been principal investigators in activities contracted 
by external agents over the period 1999-2004, we find a positive effect of research funding on 
the amount of consulting contracts obtained by academic scientists. We also find that both 
networking and signalling effects are present and contribute to explain the amount of consulting 
activity acquired by academic scientists. By offering evidence of a positive correlation between 
the volume of academic consulting and different types of extramural research funding, our paper 
shows that: a) consulting is largely a function of strong involvement in research, knowledge-
generation activities; b) the positive connection is particularly strong for the social sciences, 
where the type of knowledge transferred is more likely to be conceptual and symbolic than 
instrumental. 
 
Keywords: academic consulting; technology policy; knowledge and technology train 
                                                 
 Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, via Inama 5, 38122 Trento, Italy, e-mail: 
francesco.rentocchini@economia.unitn.it, Tel: +39 0461 882162, Fax: +39 0461 882222 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2012/03 
3 
1 Introduction	
Academic researchers are becoming increasingly accountable, from public funded agencies, to 
provide evidence of excellence in their research activities and demonstrate economic and social 
relevance of their research findings. This balance between excellence and utility of academic 
research is not always easy to achieve. While it is generally acknowledged that generation of 
knowledge is critical to produce any valuable knowledge to be eventually transferred, it is not 
always easy to strike a balance between the efforts oriented to knowledge creation and those 
required for effective knowledge transfer to potential users. Indeed, there is mixed evidence 
about whether these two activities - ‘doing research’ and ‘conducting knowledge transfer’ - are 
actually in conflict or they rather complement one another.  
We examine this issue by investigating the relationship between the sources of funding for 
research activities and the engagement of scientists in one specific type of knowledge transfer: 
academic consulting. On the one hand, we focus on the sources of funding for research. 
Undertaking research requires access to funding, which is instrumental to recruit qualified 
researchers, have access to specialised equipment and materials, and to setting up the conditions 
for potential knowledge creation activities and scientific discoveries. Research funding is 
normally obtained through research grants, research contracts, or a combination of the two.  
On the other hand, while acknowledging that knowledge transfer can take a wider variety of 
forms, we focus on academic consulting as this is a relevant and strategic vehicle for knowledge 
transfer. The rationale for this choice is based on the following arguments. First, academic 
consulting implies a direct, personal interaction between scientists and users, and a purposeful 
effort (often a bi-directional one) to agree on expected goals and to deliver actionable knowledge 
and expertise. Second, academic consulting is a widespread phenomenon compared to other 
contractual (i.e. licensing) or relational (joint research) channels of interactions with non-
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academic organisations. Despite this, consulting has been largely under-examined in the 
literature, to some extent as a consequence of the difficulty to systematically trace consulting 
activities due to its often informal character.       
In examining the relationship between the amount of extramural research budget obtained by the 
scientist and the amount of engagement in consulting activities, we theorize two main channels 
through which scientists can attract consulting contracts: networking and signalling. On the one 
hand, a researcher might gain a reputation as a “trustful” partner among those who have 
interacted with him and who serve as informants to their second-tier connections (network 
effect). On the other hand, a researcher able to attract external budget for research through 
competitive grants might be reputed as a critical contributor to a relevant body of knowledge and 
as a highly qualified and excellent scientist (signalling effect). We also propose a rationale to 
explain why external funding may detract researchers from consulting: research-orientation. 
Researchers who are mainly oriented to curiosity-driven research and wish autonomy in deciding 
their research agendas, are less likely to dedicate deliberate efforts to knowledge transfer or 
compromise their own research targets to external sponsors’ goals.  
To test our hypotheses we rely on a sample of 2603 individual faculty, from five Spanish 
universities, who have been recipients of publicly funded grants or have been principal 
investigators in activities contracted by external agents (mainly government agencies or 
companies) over the period 1999-2004. We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and 
estimate several linear and non-linear panel data models, in this way controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, reverse causality and censoring in the data. 
We find, on the whole, a positive effect of research funding on the amount of consulting 
contracts obtained by academic scientists in our sample. Moreover, we find that both networking 
and signalling effects are present and contribute to explain the amount of consulting activity 
acquired by academic scientists. More specifically, we find that doubling the amount of research 
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budget financed by a client yields a 4% increase in the amount of consulting value and that 
doubling the amount of competitive research grants increases the amount of consulting value of 
2%. However, if we look at each of the scientific disciplines separately, the above mentioned 
effects are found to hold mainly in the field of ‘social sciences’ and to a weaker extent in hard 
sciences and life sciences.  
Our results are also of interest to policymakers aiming to stimulate technological and economic 
development from university research. University-industry collaborations have been attracting 
the attention of policymakers for years. However, to date, policy measures have largely been 
directed to support collaboration through patents and spin-offs. By offering evidence of a 
positive correlation between the volume of academic consulting and different types of 
extramural research funding, we argue that: a) consulting is largely a function of strong 
involvement in research, knowledge-generation activities – little valuable (i.e. paid) consulting 
emerges as a substitution for publicly funded research; b) the positive connection is particularly 
strong for the social sciences, where the type of knowledge transferred is more likely to be 
conceptual and symbolic than instrumental.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we propose the theoretical background of 
the paper. In Section 5, we illustrate the data set and describe the sample used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 6 specifies the econometric models and describes the variables included in the 
models. Section 7 summarizes the results of the econometric estimates. The last section 
synthesizes the main findings, acknowledges the limitations of the study, and indicates directions 
for further research. 
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2 Theoretical	background		
2.1 Defining	academic	consulting	
Many authors have argued that consulting can be a strategic vehicle for transferring knowledge 
between academic scientists and decision-makers in companies and government agencies, as 
consulting can be particularly effective at promoting an interactive and problem-solving oriented 
mode of knowledge use [13]. The problem, however, has been placed on whether consulting 
distracts academics from doing research or whether both activities go hand in hand [18]. Before 
moving on to address this issue, it is first important to agree on a definition for academic 
consulting. 
Following Perkmann and Walsh [18: 1885], we define academic consulting as “the provision of 
a service by academics to external organizations on commercial terms. This may involve 
providing advice, resolving problems as well as generating or testing new ideas”.1 As pointed out 
by Bozeman and Gaughan [4: 695]: “consulting agreements (…) are not generally viewed as 
‘university funding’ since they typically provide no institutional funds for the university and are 
made on a bilateral basis with the individual. The only university role in individual consulting is 
to set policies about the acceptable amount of time devoted to consulting and about conflicts of 
interest and use of university resources in consulting”.  
Perkmann and Walsh [18] go further into the characterisation of different types of academic 
consulting, suggesting three forms of consulting according to the motivations of the researcher: 
opportunity driven, commercialisation-driven and research-driven. Research-driven consulting is 
expected to be consubstantial with academic research, as this type of consulting is directly 
related to academics’ research projects; while opportunity driven consulting is expected to be 
                                                 
1 Other definitions of consulting are also in line, such as Jacobson et al. [13], who define consulting as: “Consulting 
is broadly defined as a process of transferring expertise, knowledge, and/or skills from one party (the consultant) to 
another (the client) with the aim of providing help or solving problems” (13: 302). 
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negatively associated with research, as the main motivation from academics is to respond to 
personal income opportunities. Commercialisation-driven is not expected to have any impact on 
research productivity, as it is linked to the scientists’ efforts to commercialise their own 
technologies.  
While we fully concur with the above characterisation of academic consulting, which constitutes 
the starting point of our conceptual framework, we think it is important to bring to the 
foreground the potential differences in the consulting-modes across different fields of science, 
particularly due to the distinct demands from the contracting partners in consulting activities. 
This is important since, as we argue below, ‘to whom’ knowledge is dominantly transferred may 
fundamentally affect ‘what’ type of knowledge is transferred.  
External organisations that act as clients hiring academics for consulting purposes, can be of very 
different types: companies, government agencies, private associations, not-for-profit 
organisations or particulars, to cite a few. It is critical to pay attention to this as the needs for 
academic consulting may differ substantially by type of client. Different clients may look for 
very distinct forms of expertise. Companies might differ substantially from government 
agencies, for instance, in the roles they expect from consultants. Whether organisations search 
for a technician, an adviser, a fact finder, an applied theoretician or a bridge builder, among other 
consultant roles pointed out by Gallessich [9], might depend on the type of contracting partner.  
Accordingly, it is likely to expect that companies are more often in search of technical expertise 
and managerial advice from consultants, compared to government agencies, which may be more 
likely to look for reputed experts capable of shedding new light on alternatives for strategic 
action available to policy-makers. Indeed, the type of knowledge transferred through consulting 
depends on the use that clients want to make of university research findings and on the type of 
expertise embodied by the academic researcher [16].  
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As Amara et al. [2] have argued, university research can be useful for different purposes: 
instrumental, conceptual and symbolic. Instrumental use is defined as acting on research in 
specific and direct ways, such as to solve a particular problem at hand [16]. Conceptual use 
involves using research to inform debate by providing concepts and theoretical perspectives that 
contribute to enlightening the decision making process [22]. Symbolic use involves using 
research knowledge to justify, support or legitimate pre-determined positions or actions taken by 
the client [2,16].  
Instrumental use is likely to be dominant in the context of consulting activities contracted by 
organisations interested in getting access to scientific expertise and specialised facilities to solve 
well-defined technical problems. Companies are clear candidates to demand this type of 
consulting, which is likely to entail personal income opportunities for the academic scientists 
(i.e. “opportunity-driven” consulting). However, companies are also frequent clients of 
consulting services driven by the pursuit of enlightenment for strategic decision-making, which 
is likely to require more substantive contribution from the scientists and might be more 
compatible with research activities. Consulting activities contracted by companies, therefore, 
could be compatible with the different types of scientists’ motivations to engage in consulting, 
suggested by Perkmann and Walsh [18]: opportunity-driven, commercialisation-driven and 
research-driven.  
On the contrary, conceptual and symbolic use might be dominant in the case of government 
agencies as contractors, who are more interested in searching for factual evidence and conceptual 
frameworks to inform strategic decision-making. In this sense, we could expect that when 
scientists engage in consulting patterns dominated by government agencies as contractors, these 
consulting activities could be more complementary with research activities, and thus akin to the 
type characterised as research-driven consulting.  
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In short, we argue that considering explicitly the different nature of the partners involved as 
consultant contractors (e.g. whether companies or government agencies) can provide further 
insights into the distinction made by Perkmann and Walsh [18], about the different types of 
academic consulting. More particularly, if the dominant type of partner in consulting contracts 
differs across scientific fields of science, the explicit consideration of the type of consultant 
contractor can help us improve our understanding about the circumstances under which the 
degree of conflict between ‘doing research’ and ‘doing consulting’ could be particularly acute, or 
conversely whether there is an easy compromise between the two. The following section 
addresses the relationship between doing research and doing consulting in further detail.  
2.2 Relationship	between	doing	research	and	doing	consulting	
2.2.1 Financial	 resources	 for	 research	 and	 engagement	 in	 consulting	
activities	
Conducting research activities requires funding; often, lots of funding. Those academics who 
have large amounts of funding available for research, or have numerous funding opportunities 
due to an extraordinary research track, may enjoy a particularly unique position to decide the 
direction of their research, and follow their own will in setting research goals. This makes them 
less susceptible to be bound to funding agencies’ goals in pursuit for funding. 
To the extent that one of the determinants to engage in consulting is associated to resource-
scarcity [15] and to personal income motivations [18], scientists who are successful fund raisers 
should be particularly less prone to engage in consulting activities as compared to researchers 
who have few opportunities to obtain funding for research. Drawing on this argument, we will 
contend that scientists with large volumes of funding available for conducting research activities, 
should exhibit a lower likelihood to engage in consulting activities. 
However, the relationship between research funding and engagement in consulting may not be 
that simple. Abundance of resources to conduct research may actually spur knowledge transfer 
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activities to non-academic organisations. Indeed, resource-abundance may provide the 
appropriate conditions to mobilise research capabilities and scientific expertise to provide advice 
and services to companies and government agencies [15]. These affluent researchers may 
become particularly well-endowed to engage in consulting, not only because of the financial, 
human and technical resources available to them, but also due to the opportunities to divert 
efforts away from the production of academically valuable results, towards the demonstration of 
the utility, applicability and socio-economic impact of their research findings.   
 
Drawing on the above discussion, we put forward the following two competing hypotheses: 
 
H1a. Academic scientists who have larger volumes of funding available for research will 
exhibit a greater degree of involvement in consulting activities.  
  
H1b. Academic scientists who have larger volumes of funding available for research will 
exhibit a lower degree of involvement in consulting activities.  
  
 
2.2.2 Multiple	sources	of	funding	and	engagement	in	consulting	activities		
Research funding comes from various types of sponsors - i.e. public or private - and research 
funding can be mission-oriented or target-free. As Goldfarb [12] has put it: “research is a 
sponsored activity”. However, who sponsors research and how research funding is channelled to 
the academic researcher, can have a great influence in shaping the balance between excellence 
and utility in research activities. There are two main fundamental mechanisms to channel 
funding for conducting research activities: competitive and contract funding [4, 11, 12]. For the 
purpose of our narrative, it is important to discuss them in some detail. 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2012/03 
11 
3 Competitive	funding	
Competitive funding refers to public funding allocated through research grants. That is, funding 
is provided to universities by the National Science Ministries, Research Councils or international 
institutions2. These government agencies allocate funds through research grants, which are 
awarded after a peer review decision process has examined the scientific merits of proposals and 
applicants. While a variable proportion of competitive funding might be a response to specific 
government targets, this system is characterised largely by being a bottom-up process where 
applicants (typically, university researchers) propose lines of research they feel most attracted to. 
Competitive grants are oriented to support scientific production of high impact and provide, to 
the awarded researchers, the extraordinary opportunity to follow a curiosity-driven research 
agenda. In short, and to put it bluntly: within the context of competitive grants, government 
funding agencies would prioritise the claim and demonstration of scientific excellence as 
mandatory; while utility and use as largely recommendable.  
When it comes to the relationship between competitive funding and academic consulting, two 
conflicting logics seem to be at work. On the one hand, a ‘research orientation’ effect: if grant 
holders are dominantly oriented towards curiosity-driven research and to conforming with the 
norms of science in terms of first priority and scientific impact, they are likely to be less 
concerned about raising the attention of potential users or even identifying them. This logic 
would support the argument of a substitution effect, as researchers with large amounts of funding 
from competitive grants would be less likely to engage in consulting activities. 
On the other hand, there is a ‘signalling’ effect. Academics that excel in raising competitive 
funding for research are either contrasted outstanding scientists with a long-standing track of 
highly cited work or scientists with a promising research agenda, who are likely candidates to 
make an impression among potential users of university research. Non-academic organisations 
                                                 
2 For instance, the Framework Programmes of the Commission of the European Union.  
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may particularly direct their focus to this type of scientists, as they are particularly visible and 
well-known experts in the field [4]. This logic would support the argument of a complementary 
effect, as researchers with large amounts of funding from competitive grants would be more 
likely to engage in consulting services.   
As before, following the preceding discussion, we formulate the above logics as two competing 
hypotheses: 
 
H2a. Academic scientists who have larger volumes of ‘competitive’ funding available for 
research will exhibit a greater degree of involvement in consulting activities.  
  
H2b. Academic scientists who have larger volumes of ‘competitive’ funding available for 
research will exhibit a greater degree of involvement in consulting activities. 
 
4 Contract	funding	
Contract funding is characterised by being a more demand-driven process where the sponsoring 
agency, be this a public or a private organisation, allocates money for research either through a 
tender to invite applications or directly connecting with a university research team. Research 
contracts generally involve well-specified goals and are more mission-targeted than competitive 
grants. Contract funding also tends to be short or medium term, and generally involves more 
applied research than fundamental or basic research. As Geuna [11] and Goldfarb [12] have 
argued, the importance of this vehicle to channel research funding has increased in importance, 
in part as a response to pressure from policy makers to make scientific research more relevant 
and more oriented towards socially useful goals. Even though contract funding involves 
knowledge creation and scientific production, the main goal is to satisfy the targets defined by 
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the research sponsor, and it may not necessarily involve reaching the higher standards of 
scientific excellence. In short, and to put it bluntly again: within the context of contract funding, 
research sponsoring agencies would prioritise the production of useful results, according to the 
initially agreed goals, as mandatory; while the contribution to scientific excellence as largely  
recommendable.  
The relationship between contract funding and academic consulting is likely to be less 
compounded than in the case of competitive funding; however, it is still likely to be multifaceted. 
There are two main logics to support a positive relationship between contract funding and 
academic consulting. On the one hand, the ‘embedded’ logic. Consulting activities can be 
directly linked to the sponsored research activities in which researchers are involved. In this 
sense, co-production of knowledge between the contracting agent and the academic scientist 
might require consulting activities as an integral part of the research project [18]. In less idyllic 
terms, Goldfarb [12] points out the risk of a path-dependent process in which scientists who 
dominantly engage in sponsored, contract research could experience a limitation in the likelihood 
of generating important insights and discoveries, and restrict themselves to a narrower range of 
funding opportunities; mainly to funding channels oriented to satisfy sponsors and to consulting 
activities.     
On the other hand, there is a ‘network’ logic that supports the argument for a positive 
relationship between contract funding and consulting. This logic builds on the idea that 
involvement in research projects sponsored by industry or government agencies improves the 
scientists understanding of the context of application of their research, and helps advance the 
scientists’ skills to increase reliability in reaching agreed targets, delivering useful results and 
overcoming conflicts of interest and cultural barriers associated to the exchange of codified and 
tacit knowledge [5]. The reinforcement of these collaboration-related skills, due engagement in 
sponsored research projects, helps creating trustful relationships with non-academic 
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organisations, and building strong and weak ties with external organisations. In short, being 
considered as a trusted academic partner and having a wide network of potential sponsors, is 
likely to increases the opportunities for deepening the engagement in consulting activities. 
Indeed, some empirical evidence has already shown that the involvement of academics in 
industry-sponsored research increases the probability that scientists engage in consulting 
activities [7, 15].  
Drawing on the preceding discussion, we put forward the following hypothesis:  
 
H3. Academic scientists who have larger volumes of ‘contract’ funding available for 
research, will exhibit a greater degree of involvement in consulting activities.  
 
 Differences by field of science 
Finally, the strength and direction of the relationship between sources of funding for research 
and the degree of engagement in consulting activities may be contingent on the scientific 
discipline of scientists. As argued above, certain types of consulting activities are more likely to 
be consubstantial with conducting research, due to the type of knowledge transferred: whether 
instrumental, conceptual or symbolic. Scientists in certain disciplines might be more frequently 
engaged in consulting activities that involve an instrumental use of knowledge as compared to a 
conceptual or a symbolic use of knowledge.    
There is a vast literature on how social science research may affect decision making in both 
government agencies and companies. Weiss [22] and Beyer and Trice [3] argue that instrumental 
use of research findings is relatively infrequent in the field of social science, because of the 
difficulty to produce general and immediately applicable results and prescriptions for 
organizations that exhibit idiosyncratic routines and distinct repertoires of behaviour. On the 
contrary, they sustain that conceptual use of research, such as using basic concepts, general 
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principles or theory-related ideas for enlightening decision-making, is a more frequent form of 
use. Conceptual use is not so constrained by the distinct repertories of behaviours in 
organisations, as it gives users the autonomy to “selecting, redefining, altering, combining and 
generally reinterpreting research results to fit a wide variety of circumstances”[3: 600].  
In consulting activities where substantive work includes tasks like conducting literature reviews 
and syntheses of best practices, collecting qualitative and/or quantitative data, analyzing data and 
developing recommendations, consulting can be complementary to the scientists’ research 
activities. This range of tasks can be common to consulting activities in many fields of science. 
However, it is likely that consulting in engineering and biomedical sciences, in particular, 
includes also a significant proportion of commercial and standardised services based on the 
provision of tests and technical analysis – using specialised equipment facilities and expertise 
available at universities. This type of consulting activities can be characterized as the provision 
of a commodity service product, susceptible for a direct application among a wider client-base of 
potential contracting organizations. In this sense, this latter type of consulting is more akin to the 
opportunity-driven type, and thus, less closely linked to knowledge-generation oriented research 
activities. 
Drawing on the preceding discussion, we put forward the following hypothesis:  
 
H4. In fields of science where knowledge transfer via consulting is more often conceptual and 
symbolic (rather than instrumental), we would expect a stronger complementarity between 
research activities and consulting activities.  
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5 Data	sources	and	descriptive	statistics	
5.1 Data	
The main source of information used in this investigation was provided by the technology and 
transfer offices of the five public universities of the Valencian Higher Education system: 
University of Alicante (UA), Miguel Hernández University (UMH), Jaume I University (UJI), 
University of Valencia (UV) and the Polytechnic University of Valencia (UPV). Except for the 
University of Valencia, all other universities have been created in the last 40 years. The data are 
analysed at the individual faculty level. Our sample consists of 2603 research active faculty – 
that is, academics who have been recipients of publicly funded grants or principal investigators 
in R&D contracts over the period 1999-2004. 
Our faculty sample is distributed across the five universities considered in this study, as follows: 
37% at UV; 28% UPV; 12% UA; 13% UJI; and 10% UMH (a distribution that is largely 
identical to that corresponding to the entire faculty population across the five universities). One 
of the value added features of this data is that it provides detailed time varying information on 
the specific type of research projects and contracts in which academic researchers have been 
involved over the period 1999-2004. This includes project level information for both publicly 
funded research projects and contractual arrangements with third-parties, either industry or 
public administration. One of the contractual arrangements for which this data provides detail 
information is academic consulting, including the precise number of consulting contracts in 
which researchers are engaged as well as the amount of funding obtained through this source.  
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5.2 Academic	consulting		
In order to fully understand the nature of our data on academic consulting, it is important to 
provide a brief overview on the regulation that governs the contractual arrangements that 
university researchers are allowed to establish with non-academic agents.  
In the Spanish context, university-industry linkages are regulated by the Organic Law of 
Universities (LOU-2001, and specifically, Article 83). This regulation authorizes academic 
researchers to sign agreements with public or private organisations for the development of work 
of a scientific, technical or artistic nature, as well as for the development of specialisation 
courses or specific activities associated with training. In this sense, academics have the capacity 
to establish contractual arrangements with companies, and perform advisory and consulting 
agreements for them, provided that such contracts are established through the university – that is, 
through the organisational structures available at universities that have the mission to 
channelling knowledge and technology transfer activities.  
Under this University Act, each university is autonomous in establishing procedures for 
authorisation of the work and monitoring consulting agreements, and to set the criteria to 
determine the destination of the assets and resources obtained through these agreements. In the 
case of the Polytechnic University of Valencia (UPV), for example, this university retains 10% 
of the total amount of funding from external agents in concept of overheads, while the rest of the 
stream of income from the contract covers the material costs involved in the development of the 
planned tasks and the remuneration of the academic scientist responsible for the implementation 
of the activities agreed in the consulting contract. With regards to the remuneration of faculty 
involved in consulting activities, the income received must not exceed 1.5 times the annual 
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salary that corresponds to the highest category of academic faculty – i.e. the category of full-time 
professor3. 
Considering this legal framework as our point of reference, consulting activities are identified on 
the basis of well-defined activities developed through contractual agreements. More specifically, 
the purpose of these contractual arrangements is generally an activity aimed at solving specific 
problems and provide qualitative advice: it is not supposed to generate new scientific or 
technological knowledge, but can promote or facilitate technical and/or organisational 
innovation. In this type of contracts we find technical and professional work, including design 
and technological support to industry. Consulting work also includes other type of tasks such as 
technical services (e.g. data analysis, testing) that are normally provided by universities through 
specialised equipment and skilled personnel available at research centres. 
Drawing on the above characterisation of academic consulting, Table 1 shows that academic 
consulting is a frequent contractual arrangement among academics in the universities analysed in 
this paper. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, 46% of our sample of academic researchers has been 
involved at least once in academic consulting over the period 1999-2004. The proportion of 
scientists involved in academic consulting is systematically higher than the proportion of 
scientists involved in R&D contracts, regardless of the field of science. It is also interesting to 
note, however, that there are significant differences by scientific discipline, with regards to the 
degree of engagement in consulting activities. Scientists in engineering-related fields have a 
much higher propensity to engage in academic consulting – above 70% of scientists in 
Engineering engage in academic consulting over the six-year period analysed, compared to 46% 
for the case of scientists in Social Sciences or 32% for scientists in Mathematics and Physics.    
 
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 in here] 
                                                 
3 UPV’s Management Regulations for Research, Technology Transfer and Continuing Education, BOUPV 43, 
http://www.upv.es/entidades/SG/infoweb/sg/info/U0537298.pdf. 
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It is worth noting that the volume of funding is substantially different per mode of contract type. 
As Table 2 shows, consulting agreements (column 1) involve, on average, a much lower volume 
of funding compared to contract R&D (column 2) and competitive R&D (columns 3 and 4).  The 
average volume of funding increases as we move from consulting to contract R&D and to 
competitive R&D, which is largely a consequence of the fact that consulting agreements are 
generally much shorter term contracts, and involve lower amounts of time committed by PIs, 
compared to contract R&D and competitive R&D. We distinguish two types of competitive 
R&D funding (i.e. National and International R&D) because national standard grants might 
substantially differ from international grants in terms of the volume of resources mobilised and 
the reviewing processes involved in the assessments leading to the final award decisions. 
Finally, Table 3 shows that there are notable differences, by field of science, with regards to the 
type of contracting organisations that pay for consulting services. Companies are the most 
important client for academic consulting in several fields of science, accounting for 
approximately 50% of the total volume of funding committed to consulting services in the cases 
of Engineering and Biomedical Sciences. Conversely, in Humanities and Social Sciences, 
government agencies represent the single most important contractor of consulting services, 
accounting for about 40% of the total volume of paid consultancy.   
 
6 Econometric	model	
 
6.1 Dependent	variables	and	methods	
As discussed in Section 2.2, we are interested in examining the relationship between doing 
research and doing consulting. 
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The model can be written as: 
 
where VConsultingit is the dependent variable and is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total amount of consulting obtained by scientist i in year t (plus one); xi,t-1 denotes the set of time-
varying covariates measured at the time t-1 to partially control for reverse causality issues (see 
Section 6.2); Zi indicates a series of individual-specific control variables (see again Section 6.2), 
μi the unobserved individual-specific effect, and εit is the error term. 
We measure the extent of engagement in consulting by using the information available in our 
dataset. In particular, we use the total monetary income from the consulting contract obtained by 
the scientists contained in the sample. We spread the contract value over the whole award period, 
i.e., if the contract lasts 2 years we split it equally across those 2 years. This is done in order to 
account for the on-going benefits and implications of a contract and to mitigate against the eﬀect 
of focusing all the funds at the beginning of the period. 
To study the relationship between scientists’ sources of funding and the extent of engagement in 
consulting activities we investigate which, among the multiple sources of funding available to 
the researcher, influence the amount of consulting obtained. We employ different specifications 
of our panel data model: a pooled cross-sectional approach, a random effects estimator, a 
censored random effects estimator and fixed effects estimators. 
We estimate different versions of this model. First, we assume that μi = 0, and thus the model can 
be estimated as a simple pooled cross-sectional model, where we adjust the standard errors for 
firm clusters to account for the panel structure of the data. Thus, we allow the error terms to be 
correlated within individual observations. Although useful as starting point, the pooled model 
has the disadvantage of not controlling for unobserved time-invariant factors such as scientist 
ability that are relevant in estimating consistently the coefficients of the regression model. In the 
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second version of the model, we apply a random-effects panel estimator so that μi is different 
from zero. However, this requires the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity term to be 
distributed with mean equal to the average of the individual effect. In the third version of the 
model, we apply a random-effects tobit panel data estimator to deal with the censoring of the 
data (i.e. VConsultingit takes value 0 in 54% of cases). Finally, in our fourth and preferred model 
we apply alternative fixed-effects panel data estimators that get rid of the unobserved 
heterogeneity term and thus fully control for his influence on our estimates. In particular, we 
apply a within estimator that eliminates all time-invariant regressors and is able to provide 
consistent estimators for the time-variant ones. Unfortunately, by definition time-invariant 
regressors are not estimated because not identified. As a second fixed effects estimator we 
provide the Hausman-Taylor estimator that is an instrumental variable estimator that additionally 
enables the coefficients of time-invariant covariates to be estimated. 
 
6.2 Independent	and	control	variables		
Our main independent variables, as discussed in Section 2.2, are variables pertaining to the 
different sources of funding available to the individual scientist: the overall volume of funding 
for conducting research, the volume of competitive funding and the volume of contract funding. 
These variables were defined as stocks (rather than flows) because we expect scientist’s rate of 
engagement in consulting to be affected by the cumulated stocks of funding and not only by 
current or lagged flows. Moreover, using variables in stocks overcomes a potential endogeneity 
problem that can arise if flows are used instead. In this framework, the stock variables were 
computed using the perpetual inventory method based on the following formulas:  
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As far as the pre-sample growth rate g for Xs are concerned, we assume them to be equal to the 
average growth rate of X in our sample over the period 1999-2004. As far as the depreciation rate 
(δ) for Xs is concerned, we assume a constant value of 0.15 as is common in the cited literature. 
The stock variables are as follows. First, VContracti,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the stock of 
funding (plus one) to support research activity provided by external agents (firms, public 
administrations, other individuals, etc.) to scientist i in year t-1. Second, VCompetNati,t-1 is the 
natural logarithm of the stock of funding (plus one) to support research activity obtained via 
competitive funding at the regional and national level (e.g. National Plan Standard Grants4) by 
scientist i in year t-1. Third, VCompetInti,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the stock of funding (plus 
one) to support research activity obtained via competitive funding at the international level (e.g. 
EU funded projects) by scientist i in year t-1. Finally, VFundingi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
stock of funding (plus one) to support research activity obtained via the three means defined 
above by scientist i in year t-1. 
The other explanatory variables, which act mainly as controls, are as follows. Expi is a proxy for 
work experience and is measured as the number of quinquenios5 obtained by the scientist. In 
order to control for the presence of a curvilinear effect in the level of experience we also include 
the squared value of the last variable: Expi2. We also control for the status, the environment and 
the field in which the scientist operates. In particular, we control for the effects stemming from 
the academic position of the scientist (DAcademicPositioni), University affiliation (DUniversityi) 
                                                 
4 The National Plan standard grants represent the most important vehicle for competitive grants at the National level 
for Spanish academic researchers (see the following link for further details www.idi.mineco.gob.es ). 
5 In Spain, the quinquenio (literally a five-year period) is a form of recognition granted to academic scientists based 
on their experience and affects their salaries. Quinquenios are granted every five years, following an evaluation 
process. Thus, a professor who has been in a university for 20 years could possess up to 4 quinquenios. We use 
Quinquenios as a proxy for academic experience. 
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and year effects (DYeari) by including a series of specific dummies. Finally, we control for 
specific effects due to the scientific field by including a series of field-specific dummies.6 
shows the correlation matrix for all the time variant variables included in our analysis 
(VConsutling, VContract, VCompetNat, VCompetInt) and for the variable accounting for 
experience at the individual level: Exp. As Table 4 shows, variables are weakly correlated to each 
other, suggesting there should be no multicollinearity problems with our data.  
    [Table 4 in here] 
 
7 Results		
The empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between multiple sources of research funding 
and the amount of consulting activities obtained by the individual scientist and is mainly based 
on panel data model estimation to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The estimation is presented in two steps. First, we present different panel data estimators of the 
econometric model presented in the previous section on the overall sample comprising 2603 
individuals (Table 5). At this stage, the main aim is to find support for the hypotheses 1 to 3 
developed in the theoretical section of the paper. Second, among the different estimation 
strategies we choose the most reliable one and applied it on different sub-samples composed by 
individuals working in different fields of science (Table 6). At this stage, we aim to find support 
for hypothesis 4. 
The regression results of the first step of estimates are reported in Table 5. The first two columns 
contains pooled cross-sectional estimates, the second and third are random-effects panel data 
estimator (linear and censored respectively) that account for unobserved scientist-specific 
                                                 
6 We considered the following five scientific fields: (i) Agricultural, Biological and Medical Sciences; (ii) Social 
Sicences; (iii) Humanities; (iv) Mathematics and Physics; and (v) Engineering and Technology. 
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heterogeneity by assuming that its expected value is equal to zero. The estimates in columns 4, 5 
and 6 relax this assumption by estimating fixed effects. 
Overall, Table 5 shows the following results. Across all the different specifications, the volume of 
contract funding for research - variable VContract - has a positive impact on the extent of 
engagement in consulting activities. This result supports hypothesis 3. According to the fixed 
effects model, that is the one estimating in the most reliable way the coefficient of interest, 
doubling the amount of contract funding for research increases by 4% the amount of consulting 
contracts obtained. A similar result, supporting hypothesis 1a, is found for the volume of funding 
available for conducting research (variable VResearch). Column 4 of Table 5 shows that doubling 
the amount of research funding increases of 3% the amount of consulting contracts obtained.  
The amount of competitive funding obtained at the national level – variable VCompetNat - has a 
negative and significant effect according to the specifications contained in columns 1 and 3. The 
sign of the coefficient changes to positive in the fixed effects specification. This clearly shows 
the relevance of controlling for fixed effects such as scientist innate ability. The negative effect 
of VCompetNat on Consulting can be actually driven by a negative correlation between 
unobserved heterogeneity at the scientist level that is not controlled properly in the other 
specifications. The positive sign supports hypothesis H2b. 
A similar behaviour is apparent from the amount of competitive funding obtained at the 
international level – variable VCompetInt – that from positive in column 1 changes to negative in 
the fixed effects specifications in columns 5 and 6. By the same reasoning applied above, the 
apparent positive relationship between VCompetInt and VConsulting is driven by the strong 
positive correlation between the latter and the unobserved heterogeneity term that, once 
controlled for, changes the sign of the relationship. This result is consistent with hypothesis H2a. 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of Exp is positive and significant at conventional 
confidence levels in all of the specifications. Reasonably enough, experience plays a positive 
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role in obtaining consulting contracts. Interestingly, all of the remaining controls are significant 
at a joint level (Position dummies, Time dummies, University Dummies and Field Dummies). In 
Table 5 we also provide the results of scientific field dummies because they are informative about 
the role played by different scientific areas in the extent of consulting activity. As expected from 
Table 1, both Humanities and Mathematics & Physics exhibits a significant and negative 
coefficient meaning that by working in this field a scientist should be expected to collect less 
consulting contracts compared to Agricultural, Biological & Medical Sciences (the reference 
category). Always in line with expectations, Engineering & Technology field exhibits a positive 
and significant coefficient. 
[Table 5	in here] 
Table 6 shows results of the within estimator (our preferred specification) across the different 
scientific fields. The table shows a non-negligible heterogeneity at the field level with some of 
the results presented above holding for some scientific areas while losing their significance in 
others. Nevertheless, a clear pattern is present in the Social sciences where the coefficients of 
both VContract and VCompetNat are positive and significant. We interpret this result as 
supporting hypothesis 4. In particular, we expect knowledge transfer in social sciences to be 
more conceptual and symbolic (rather than instrumental) and, in line with that, a higher 
complementarity between funding for research and the amount of consulting activities is found. 
In this case, we can talk of a genuine social science effect. 
[Table 6	in here] 
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8 Conclusion	
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the sources of funding for research activities 
and the engagement of scientists in one specific type of knowledge transfer: academic 
consulting.  
By using a unique data set comprising project-level funding information for 2603 individual 
faculty, from five Spanish universities over the period 1999-2004, and through the application of 
a panel data econometric approach, we find a positive effect of research funding on the amount 
of consulting contracts obtained by academic scientists. Moreover, we find that both networking 
and signalling effects are present and contribute to explain the amount of consulting activity 
acquired by academic scientists. However, if we look at each of the scientific disciplines 
separately, the above mentioned effects are found to hold mainly in the field of ‘social sciences’ 
and to a weaker extent in hard sciences and life sciences. 
The paper, in the spirit of the present special issue, contributes to the relevant literature in two 
main respects. First, it adds to the extensive academic debate on university-industry interactions, 
by moving beyond technology transfer and studying softer, less easily traceable channels of 
interaction [21]. As several authors have noted, technology transfer channels (i.e. patents or 
licensing IPRs) are not representative of the patterns of knowledge generation and transfer from 
public research organisations [1, 6]. However, the prevalence of other forms of collaboration 
between University and Industry as well as their internal functioning are issues still poorly 
explored [17]. 
In this sense, our work adds to the stream of the literature that specifically analyzes knowledge 
and technology transfer in university-industry linkages [10]. The engagement of scientists in 
knowledge and technology transfer activities is a topic that has attracted an increasing amount of 
interest in the last years, both among scholars and policy makers. Governments worldwide have 
been calling for greater interaction between universities and industry, under the rationale that this 
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interaction is instrumental to foster technological development and economic achievements [8] 
and to strengthen the co-evolution between scientific and commercial opportunities [20]. At the 
same time, sceptics have raised concerns about a possible negative impact that universities’ 
involvement in technology transfer can have on the production and advancement of scientific 
knowledge/production [14]. Conversely, in general, no conclusive evidence has been provided 
about whether these two activities - ‘doing research’ and ‘conducting knowledge transfer’ - are 
actually in conflict or they rather complement one another. By documenting the existence of a 
positive association between the amount of research funding and the amount of consulting 
contracts obtained by academic scientists in our sample, this paper suggests that an indirect way 
to support knowledge is through the financial support of knowledge-generation, research 
activities. 
Second, our paper has relevant practical implications. On the one hand, we show that financing 
research has a positive effect on a specific kind of knowledge transfer such as academic 
consulting. Our findings suggest that to secure informal knowledge transfer, policy makers 
should try to guarantee a continuous and non-negligible amount of funding for research (being it 
on a contractual or competitive basis). The idea that, to favour knowledge and technology 
transfer one should directly intervene on the incentives to transfer knowledge themselves, is not 
fully supported from our findings. Conversely, we show that consulting is a prevalent mode of 
university-industry interaction, across all fields of science, and, thus it might not require directed 
policy intervention measures to foster consulting activities, but rather policies oriented to secure 
that valuable knowledge generation activities are in place.  
On the other hand, we find a mixed result for the role played by competitive funding for 
academic consulting. In particular, a positive relationship of regional and national competitive 
funding with the amount of academic consulting is found, while a negative relationship is present 
in the case of international competitive funding. This result may be of interest to policymakers 
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because it suggests that signalling effect has to be nuanced to the different source of funding 
while networking effect has a clear and consistent effect on knowledge and technology transfer. 
In particular, the signalling effect can be counterbalanced and eventually reversed by a research-
orientation effect thus providing the mixed effect cited above. 
Finally, we show that the main effects discussed above are idiosyncratic to the scientific field 
considered. Although a large proportion of scientists working in engineering and technology 
fields are involved in consulting, it looks like that this particular type of knowledge transfer 
activity is weakly connected with research funding (at least with competitive funding). In the 
same vein, we reveal the peculiar case of social sciences that is found to be particularly 
conducive to academic consulting. This specificity is explained referring to the type of 
knowledge characterising the field under consideration that is more symbolic and conceptual 
compared to a more instrumental type characterising other scientific fields. Given that social 
sciences are so conducive to academic consulting, one possible vehicle to spur this knowledge 
transfer channel could be to foster contamination of other fields of science with social sciences - 
e.g. in the form of advanced specialised training [19]. In this light, the recent creation of a sub-
field such as Engineering Management could be seen as a well-headed initiative in this direction. 
Overall, a more general implication of the result refers to the role played by inter-disciplinarity 
in activating positive loops between research funding and knowledge and technology transfer in 
the form of consulting activity.	
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Table 1: Proportion of active researchers who obtained extramural budget over the period 1999-2004 by field 
of science 
 Consultancy 
Contract 
R&D National Public R&D
International 
Public R&D N 
 % % % %  
Agricultural, Biological and 
Medical Sciences 
44.76 33.14 73.17 9.00 697 
Social Sciences 45.98 38.84 52.00 5.60 448 
Humanities 35.12 18.84 65.58 3.25 430 
Mathematics and Physics 32.24 24.28 71.84 7.75 490 
Engineering and Technology 70.26 33.64 48.14 7.62 538 
Total 46.29 30.19 62.85 6.90 2603 
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Table 2: Amount of funding per contract by field of science 
 Consultancy
Contract 
R&D 
National Public 
R&D 
International Public 
R&D 
 € € € € 
Agricultural, Biological and Medical 
Sciences 
6170 21659 34764 106186 
Social Sciences 7878 12889 16286 60392 
Humanities 6591 21281 14199 65670 
Mathematics and Physics 5576 23699 33374 82076 
Engineering and Technology 6965 22016 32898 147173 
Total 6686 20070 27993 100950 
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Table 3: Distribution of volume of consulting by type of contractor and field of science (% relative to the total 
volume of paid-consultancy, in million €, for the period 1999-2004) 
 
Agricult. Bio.  
& Medical Sc. 
Social 
Sciences 
Humanities Physics & 
Mathematics
Engineering 
& Technology 
Government Agencies 34.6 41.4 38.2 31.6 30.3 
Companies 45.9 33.6 32.7 40.7 48.0 
Others* 19.6 25.0 29.1 27.7 21.7 
Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total volume 13.1 M€ 9.2 M€ 5.7 M€ 7.5 M€ 36.1 M€ 
*The category Others include: Non-profit organisations, Associations, Public and Private Resarch Institutes, individuals, etc ...  
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Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 VConsulting VContract VCompetNat VCompetInt 
VConsulting 1    
VContract 0.15 1   
VCompetNat 0.02 0.18 1  
VCompetInt 0.05 0.18 0.2 1 
Exp 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.09 
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Table 5: Results of the econometric estimates of the relationship between multiple sources of research 
funding and the amount of consulting activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Random Effects Fixed Effects 
 
Pooled 
Cross-
Section 
Random Effects
Tobit Random 
Effects 
Within 
Estimator
Within 
Estimator 
Hausman-
Taylor Fixed 
Effects 
VResearch - - - 0.03*** - - 
    (0.01)   
VContract 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.43***  0.04*** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) 
VCompetNat -0.02*** -0.01 -0.12**  0.02** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) 
VCompetInt 0.03* -0.00 -0.03  -0.03* -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Exp 0.19*** 0.20** 1.35*   0.22** 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.70)   (0.11) 
Exp2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10   -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)   (0.01) 
Field Dummies (Reference 
category: Agricultural, 
Biological and Medical 
Science) 
      
       
Social Sciences 0.09 0.11 0.84   0.13 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.86)   (0.13) 
Humanities -0.20*** -0.23* -2.40***   -0.29** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.91)   (0.13) 
Mathematics and -0.36*** -0.37*** -3.89***   -0.39*** 
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Physics 
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.90)   (0.13) 
Engineering and 
technology 
0.34*** 0.37** 2.16**   0.41*** 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.91)   (0.14) 
Year Dummies Inc. Inc. Inc.   Inc. 
Position Dummies Inc. Inc. Inc.   Inc. 
Constant 0.78*** 0.78*** -15.85*** 1.05*** 1.06*** 0.75*** 
 (0.14) (0.19) (1.45) (0.04) (0.04) (0.21) 
Joint significance of 
Position Dummies 
     11.11(2)** 
Joint significance of 
University Dummies 
     45.83(4)*** 
Joint significance of Year 
Dummies 
     25.33(4)*** 
Joint significance of Field 
Dummies 
     42.35(4)*** 
F-test 23.95***   17.07*** 7.51***  
Wald χ2  182.75(19)*** 225.28(19)***   167.77(19)*** 
No of observations 13015 13015 13015 13015 13015 13015 
No of groups 2603 2603 2603 2603 2603 2603 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors and degrees of freedom are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Results of the econometric estimates of the relationship between multiple sources of research 
funding and the amount of consulting activities by scientific field. 
 
Agricultural, biological 
and medical sciences 
Social 
sciences 
Humanities
Mathematics 
and Physics 
Engineering and 
Technology 
VContract 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 0.01 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
VCompetNat 0.03** 0.07*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
VCompetInt 0.03 -0.12* -0.08 0.08** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 
Constant 1.08*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.78*** 1.47*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
F-test 2.52* 9.32*** 0.82 2.19* 5.09*** 
No of observations 3485 2240 2150 2450 2690 
No of groups 697 448 430 490 538 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Only panel data fixed effects estimates are reported. Robust standard errors and degrees of 
freedom are in parentheses. 
 
 
